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Reviewed by James Q. Whitman*
This is a book by a philosopher, on a subject of urgent importance
to legal scholars. Yet the truth is that most legal scholars have not un-
derstood how urgent that subject is. The book is about the psychology
of the darker and uglier emotions in the law: shame and disgust. Le-
gal scholars have certainly had plenty to say about this topic. There
has been a steady flow of literature on the emotions and the law, and
in particular on shame and disgust, for the past decade or so.' Never-
theless, much of the legal debate has revolved around problems of
strikingly minor importance in American criminal justice. In particu-
lar, we have had a lot of literature on a few colorful shaming penalties,
like sentencing businessmen who urinate in public to scrub the streets
with toothbrushes, or sentencing shoplifters to wear T-shirts announc-
ing their offenses to the world.' It is no surprise that criminal law pro-
fessors enjoy debating these shaming penalties - call them T-shirt and
bumper-sticker sanctions. They are tailor-made for discussions of
* Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law, Yale University.
1 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (i989);
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (i997); THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan
A. Bandes ed., 1999); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 733, 733-62 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 62 1 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust] (reviewing MILLER, supra); Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 63o-52 (1996) [hereinafter
Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]; Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Ao Conceptions of Emo-
tion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate,
54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2ooi); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law,
89 MICH. L. REV. 188o (i991).
2 E.g., Garvey, supra note I, at 734-37; Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note i, at 633;
Markel, supra note i, at 2176. To be sure, this literature has seen that the underlying issue of
shame extends well beyond such modem forms of the pillory. For an example of this recognition,
see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 88-I1 (2000). Nevertheless, the literature's
focus has been on shaming penalties, and not on the wider extent of shame and stigma in the
American legal system. The appropriate extent of shame and stigma has also recently come be-
fore the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F 3 d 596, 604-06 (9th Cir. 2oo4).
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familiar classroom topics like communitarianism 3 and "norms."4  Most
of all, they make everybody titter. Who can resist that?
Nevertheless, the reality is that T-shirt and bumper-sticker sanc-
tions are unlikely ever to play more than the most subordinate role in
American punishment. The really pressing and troubling problems, as
Martha Nussbaum well understands, lie elsewhere - and they involve
practices that should make nobody titter. The problems of shame and
disgust appear everywhere we discover degradation and humiliation in
the law; and American criminal punishment is rife with degradation
and humiliation. Our prisons in particular are theaters of appalling
human degradation. 5  Outside prison, too, American criminal justice
humiliates offenders in ways unique in the Western world, from the
moment of arrest, sometimes televised, 6 through the occasional "perp
walk,"7 and beyond." To be arrested or convicted in America is some-
times to run a devastating gauntlet of public exposure. The same
spirit has apparently established itself in our detention camp at Guan-
tanamo Bay, where the Red Cross has complained that the United
States engages in "humiliating acts" that are tantamount to "psycho-
logical torture."9 Indeed, it is hardly a secret that the United States
3 See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 37-47 (2OOl).
4 POSNER, supra note 2, at 89-94.
5 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2001);
Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving Standards of De-
cency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 31-44 (1998); Vincent Schiraldi & Mark Soler, Editorial,
Locked Up Too Tight, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at B5 (detailing abuses in juvenile justice in-
stitutions).
6 See Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. i6,
1997, at Ai (noting that the return to shaming penalties "began in the I98O'S with mortified Wall
Street traders appearing on the nightly news in handcuffs"); Scot J. Paltrow, Giuliani Has Fans,
Foes in War on White-Collar Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1988, pt. 4, at i (describing the public
arrest of alleged white-collar criminals as part of U.S. Attorney Giuliani's efforts to make exam-
ples of the accused).
7 See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 2 12-13 (2d Cir. 200o) (holding that "perp walks" violate
the Fourth Amendment when not sufficiently related to a legitimate government objective); Han-
nah Shay Chanoine, Note, Clarifying the Joint Action Test for Media Actors When Law Enforce-
ment Violates the Fourth Amendment, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1356, 1367-8o (2004) (reviewing and
discussing "perp walk" law).
8 Sex offender registries are one notable example. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. i, 4 (2oo3) (upholding use of publicly accessible sex offender registry). The United Kingdom
is the European country that comes closest to adopting such measures of public exposure for of-
fenders who have already served their sentences. Even the British do not go as far as the Ameri-
cans, though. See Richard Ford, Figures Show Where Most Criminals Live, TIMES (London),
July 29, 2004, at 4 (noting that U.K. police and probation services publish figures on numbers of
offenders monitored in particular localities, but not the offenders' identities).
9 Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at Ai (quoting confidential reports issued by the Red Cross) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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has pursued policies of deliberate degradation, such as keeping Muslim
prisoners naked 10
Is it right for a decent country to use such methods? Should we
really be humiliating and degrading prisoners of war, or "unlawful
combatants" - or, for that matter, prison inmates? The use of hu-
miliation and degradation in punishment raises deeply unsettling ques-
tions. The occasional alternative sanction involving T-shirts is the
least of our worries. In the grand scheme of things, the T-shirt and
bumper-sticker sanctions are simply of paltry importance, and our de-
bates about them cannot do justice to the truly pressing and troubling
problems.
If we need dramatic evidence of what the truly pressing problems
are, we need only reflect on the demoralizing Abu Ghraib scandal,
which broke a few weeks after Nussbaum's book was published. All
Americans remember - or at least all Americans ought to remember
- the Abu Ghraib photos." They make it only too clear how disturb-
ing the psychological challenges of shame and disgust are for the law.
Why did the soldiers in those photos flash the thumbs-up sign, and
grin such simian grins, while they stood over the human pyramid of
naked bodies that they had built? We all remember such scenes as the
young American woman festively cocking her finger at the exposed
genitals of the cowering prisoner, or the tableaux vivants of naked
Iraqi men forced to kneel down and push their unseeing, hooded faces
into other men's penises, in a parody of fellatio. We also all know -
or ought to know - that Abu Ghraib raises troubling questions about
domestic American prisons. As newspaper reports observed in the
midst of the scandal, some of the soldiers involved were corrections of-
ficers back home, 2 and there is disturbing evidence that similar sorts
10 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT BY THE
COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS IN IRAQ
para. 24 (2004) ("Several military intelligence officers confirmed to the [Red Cross] that it was part
of the military intelligence process to hold a person deprived of his liberty naked in a completely
dark and empty cell for a prolonged period [and ,] to use inhumane and degrading treatment, in-
cluding physical and psychological coercion, against persons deprived of their liberty to secure
their cooperation."), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report2oo4/icrc-
report_iraq_feb2oo4.pdf.
11 There is evidence that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not isolated events. According to a
recent disclosure by the military, at least twenty-six prisoners have died under suspicious circum-
stances while in U.S. custody in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S.
Military Says 26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at Ai.
12 E.g., Tom Bowman, Reservist Sentenced to 8 Years in Abu Ghraib Abuse, BALT. SUN, Oct.
22, 2004, at iA (identifying a convicted Abu Ghraib participant as a Virginia state corrections of-
ficer in civilian life); Edward Wong, Top Commanders Face Questioning on Prison Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at Ai (identifying the Abu Ghraib "ringleader" as a former corrections
officer).
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of brutal and degrading practices go on in ordinary American correc-
tions facilities. 
13
What makes people charged with the task of punishment behave
this way? Do events like Abu Ghraib tell us something important
about the psychological dynamic, and psychological dangers, of pun-
ishment? The question, after all, is not just whether the soldiers in-
volved were directly ordered to engage in the particular acts we see in
those photos. Those acts were surely improvised on the spot. The
question is whether this awful human disaster was encouraged by the
broader American tolerance of humiliating and degrading punishment
methods. Did military officials invite the outbreak at Abu Ghraib by
condoning such practices as stripping prisoners naked and hooding
their faces, thus creating a climate of humiliation and degradation? Is
it possible that punishment always threatens to spin out of control, if
there is no concerted effort to guarantee that prisoners are treated re-
spectfully?' 4  These are questions to which decent Americans must
find answers, and the answers are manifestly not to be found in our
merry little controversies about T-shirts and bumper stickers.
Maybe it takes a philosopher to remind us that human psychology
presents tougher and more frightening problems than the ones we most
enjoy discussing in the classroom. The human animal is capable of
behaviors unimagined by our rational actor models, and even by our
most resolutely "behavioral" brands of law and economics. Hiding
from Humanity faces up squarely to that psychological truth. Al-
though it has been marketed, to some extent, as a book about T-shirts
and bumper stickers, Nussbaum's book is more. It is an effort at
frank reflection on the nastier human emotions, and an exploration of
their place throughout the entire landscape of the law. If the book
achieves nothing else, it will deserve praise for that. This is a book
that rubs legal scholars' noses in the problems represented by Abu
Ghraib, and it arrives at a moment in our history when that is exactly
what we need.
The ultimate success of a book depends, though, on the power of
its particular arguments, and by the end of this Review I will have to
report that I find Nussbaum's arguments disappointing. This is a
book by an author with an admirably humane sensibility, and a much
13 See Paul Lieberman & Dan Morain, Unveiling the Face of the Prison Scandal, L.A. TIMES,
June 19, 2004, at Ai (detailing prisoner abuse scandals in a prison where an Abu Ghraib guard
had worked previously, including stripping prisoners naked); Schiraldi & Soler, supra note 5 (de-
tailing abuses in juvenile justice institutions).
14 See Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT'L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 93-94 (1973) (finding that many guards became far more ag-
gressive and dehumanizing toward the prisoners than would ordinarily be predicted in a simula-
tion study).
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richer grasp of the human predicament than most of our legal academ-
ics display. It is also a book that could hardly be more timely. In the
end, however, it is a book by an author who has not, to my mind, fully
reckoned with the problems presented by the law.
I. TOWARD A EUDAIMONISTIC LAW?
Hiding from Humanity draws on many different literatures, includ-
ing psychoanalysis, law, cultural criticism, and poetry. At core,
though, it is a book of moral philosophy, and its fundamental claim is
that moral philosophy - in particular Nussbaum's eudaimonistic neo-
Stoic ethics - can shine the right kind of light into the seamy cracks
of the law. Nussbaum is one of several leading figures of the last cou-
ple of decades, among them Alasdair MacIntyre, Robert Solomon, and
the late Bernard Williams, who have tried in various ways to create a
new style of ethics.15 These philosophers are a diverse bunch, but they
generally reject the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century or-
thodoxies of figures like Bentham and Kant. Moral philosophy, they
argue, should not be founded on the image of the rational, calculating
human being known to the Benthamite tradition. Nor should it be
based on the pinched concept of submission to duty that we find in
Kant. Instead, it should start from a richer and more complex under-
standing of human nature and the human predicament.
These philosophers have often turned back to the ancients, in par-
ticular Aristotle and the Stoics, and to Nietzsche as well. Moral phi-
losophy, they have tried to show, is often best understood as a project
involving self-realization and human flourishing. It is eudaimonistic:
it is about the pursuit of the right kind of measured happiness and the
maintenance of a whole and healthy personality.' 6 Moral philosophy
ought to be naturalistic, they further argue, in the sense that it should
be about human nature: moral philosophy's concept of the good life
should be a concept of the distinctly human good life, founded in an
understanding of the complexity and diversity of the human experi-
ence in the world.
17
15 See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d
ed. 1984); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, NOT PASSION'S SLAVE: EMOTIONS AND CHOICE (2003);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (I985) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS, ETHICS]; BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY (1993).
16 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT. THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 31-33 (2ooi).
17 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, ETHICS, supra note 15, at 34-35 (discussing Aristotle's view that "a
human being is not an immaterial soul, but is essentially embodied and essentially lives a social
life"); id. at 45-47 (discussing the promise of and problems with linking psychology to the ethical
life).
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In line with their emphasis on the natural complexity of the inner
life of human beings, these philosophers have pleaded for a new atti-
tude toward the emotions. They argue that part of having a whole
and healthy personality is enjoying a rich emotional life. This means
that disregarding or denigrating the emotions would be a foolish mis-
take. It is particularly wrong to posit, as Kant does, sharp distinctions
between "reason" and the "irrational" emotions. Emotions cannot be
reduced to physiologically hard-wired or subrational instincts.1 8 Nor
are they stupid or inherently uncontrolled. They have cognitive con-
tent, and they involve moral evaluation (pp. 31-37). Anger, for exam-
ple, is not necessarily a crazed response. It may well be an entirely ra-
tional one, which appropriately condemns behavior that is simply
wrong (p. 34). Indeed, no well-lived life is without its moments of
wholly appropriate anger.
That does not mean that all the emotions are good, of course.
Nussbaum in particular has argued that one of the great lessons of the
Stoics is that the emotional life can be a source of suffering. 19 A
healthy emotional life is a life of the juste milieu, a life that avoids ex-
cess. Correspondingly, the goal of much of moral philosophy is "thera-
peutic." As the Stoic Epictetus put it, "the philosopher's lecture room
is a hospital: you ought not to walk out of it in a state of pleasure, but
in pain - for you are not in good condition when you arrive!"20 The
Stoic philosophy of the emotional life is not about surrendering to the
emotions. It is about evaluating them, and mastering them. It is
about, in the title of a well-known Nussbaum book, The Therapy of
Desire.
2'
These philosophical ideas are Nussbaum's starting point. They do
indeed seem to promise something that can help remedy the ills of our
legal scholarship. Why, after all, do we lack an analytical vocabulary
adequate to explain the degradation and humiliation of Abu Ghraib?
Is it not precisely because, to one degree or another, we remain too at-
tached to the orthodoxies of Bentham and Kant? Some of us, children
of the Utilitarians, continue to think of human beings as obeying the
dictates of calculated reason, or at least of "bounded" reason. Some of
18 See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS 15 (1976).
19 E.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetry and the Passions: Two Stoic Views, in PASSIONS AND
PERCEPTIONS: STUDIES IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 97, 128 (Jacques
Brunschwig & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1993).
20 Malcolm Schofield, Stoic Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE STOICS 233,
253 (Brad Inwood ed., 2003) (citation omitted) (quoting 3 EPICTETUS, DISCOURSES 24.30) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
21 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
HELLENISTIC ETHICS (1094) (exploring Hellenistic philosophy's dual commitments to the
"combination of logic with compassion" and to "various types of detachment and freedom from
disturbance").
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us, children of Kant, think of human beings as moral actors who can
be expected to submit piously to the demands of some version of the
categorical imperative. Neither of these approaches is completely fool-
ish or false. At the same time, neither gives us any analytical way to
account for the gleeful savagery that broke out at Abu Ghraib, and
that all too often breaks out in American punishment at home.
The truth is that we are working with exceedingly thin accounts of
human psychology, which means that we are prey to serious risks in
our efforts to manage human society. How can we organize a just sys-
tem of punishment if the people we put in charge of it start stacking
up their naked prisoners in human pyramids? How can we develop
either Benthamite or Kantian theories about how "we" should admin-
ister effective punishments, if the very business of punishment threat-
ens to turn "us," or our agents, into barbarians? A sophisticated phi-
losophy of how the human emotions function, and how they can go
wrong, may be exactly what we need.
So how does Nussbaum apply her philosophy of the emotions to
the law? She begins by insisting that the emotions do matter, in the
law as in the rest of life. In particular, she wants to fend off any sug-
gestion that the law should be based too casually upon appeals to "rea-
son" or "rationality." In rejecting easy appeals to "reason," she aban-
dons a very attractive argument, of course. One really is tempted to
describe the Abu Ghraib scandal as a descent into the subrational.
The soldiers in those terrible photos, one instinctively thinks, yielded
to their "lower," animal selves, experiencing a failure of reason. One is
even tempted to compare Abu Ghraib to the "madness" of the Nazi pe-
riod, whose horrors were attributed by a figure like Georg Lukics to
"[t]he destruction.., of reason."22 Nussbaum wants to warn us away
from that route.23 From her point of view, it would be quite wrong to
react to Abu Ghraib, or more broadly to the problems of shame and
disgust, by condemning emotionality or preaching a return to reason.
Instead, the right approach is more difficult. We must walk a finer
line, distinguishing the appropriate emotions from the inappropriate,
dangerous ones - the ones that are at the root of human moral and
emotional suffering.
Her book is, accordingly, an effort to walk the fine line between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable emotions in the law. This means that Hid-
ing from Humanity undertakes two slightly oddly yoked projects.
Some parts of the book aim to demonstrate that emotions have their
place in the law. "Reason," contrary to what its advocates (especially
22 GEORG LuKAcs, THE DESTRUCTION OF REASON 752-53 (Peter Palmer trans., Humani-
ties Press 198i) (1962).
23 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 25.
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its Utilitarian advocates (pp. 8-9)) say, is not the answer. Other parts,
though, aim to demonstrate that certain emotions - especially shame
and disgust - are out of bounds. As a result, the book inevitably has
a somewhat disjointed character. Nevertheless, in the end it hangs to-
gether perfectly well as a general assessment of the role of emotions in
the law.
Emotions, Nussbaum tells us, play an indispensable role in the law.
For example, the law of provocation is incoherent unless we recognize
that emotional reactions are sometimes regarded as wholly justifiable
(PP. 39, 68-70). Much the same is true of appeals to compassion in
sentencing (pp. 20-22, 49, 52-56). Moreover, criminalization itself pre-
supposes the validity of the emotions: "[T]he whole structure of crimi-
nal law might be said to imply a picture of what we have reason to be
angry at" (p. i i). Criminal punishment, she believes, must be founded
on some kind of emotion cognate with resentment. Without that, it
has no moral force. Even Utilitarians are compelled to admit as much:
we criminalize because we feel collective anger (pp. 9-Io). After all,
Nussbaum argues, Utilitarians must have "some account of why cer-
tain acts are bad," and any such account "is bound to refer to human
vulnerability and our interest in flourishing. But then we are already
dealing with and evaluating emotions" (p. 9).24
Nevertheless, if there can be no law without emotions, it remains
necessary to distinguish between right and wrong emotions. Which
emotions are the right ones? This question requires, Nussbaum be-
lieves, a complex answer. Even the potentially appropriate emotions
- anger, for example - can go wrong (p. 12). But the greater dangers
lie in shame and disgust: those are emotions that almost always fail to
give "good guidance for political and legal purposes" (p. 122).
Why? With this we come to the crux of Nussbaum's argument.
According to her analysis, shame and disgust are supremely dangerous
emotions for two reasons above all. First, they involve "hiding from
humanity": they are the product of discomfort with our own bodily
animality, which confronts us in the form of the various sticky and
oozy substances we secrete (pp. 89, 186). We do not like our fluidity,
which reminds us of our mortality. This translates into discomfort
with the sexuality of women, and of men who engage in passive
homosexual relations: such persons are all too easily thought of as
"foul cesspit[s] of fluids" (p. i13). Those sorts of feelings are to be
24 Nussbaum offers another, curiously unconvincing, attack on utilitarianism (pp. 58-59).
Utilitarians, she asserts, take an "antiemotion" position, which, if taken seriously, requires them to
rethink criminal law from the ground up. Yet the proudest boast of the utilitarian tradition is
that a rigorously utilitarian philosopher does not shy away from rethinking everything from the
ground up. Nussbaum's attack is hardly damning - and not only because she acknowledges that
she is herself unwilling to be bound by "traditional understandings" (p. 59).
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condemned by the eudaimonistic moral philosopher. Shame and dis-
gust are emotions experienced by people who have not mastered their
own animal existence. Such people are bad at governing themselves.
They have not learned the lesson of happiness taught by the grand
tradition of eudaimonistic philosophy stretching back to Aristotle, and
reinforced by modern psychoanalysis: the lesson that the happy person
is the person who is master of his own emotions. They are people who
are "shrinking from their own human weakness" (p. 232), as Nuss-
baum calls those who inflict shame.
Nor does it end there. Shame and disgust are further dangerous
because they are inherently hierarchical. Shame is something we in-
flict on inferiors; disgust is something we feel toward inferiors (pp. 93-
94, 98, 207).25 Both emotions "typically express themselves through
the subordination of both individuals and groups based on features of
their way of life" (p. 32 1). Indulging such emotions is thus "profoundly
subversive of the ideas of equality and dignity on which liberal society
is based" (p. 232). The dangers in the hierarchical character of these
emotions are especially clear when we review the horrible record of the
language of disgust in justifying "misogyny, anti-Semitism, and loath-
ing of homosexuals" (p. 75).26
These various evils, according to Nussbaum, are linked to a basic
failing in the sort of moral reasoning associated with both shame and
disgust. Unlike more laudable emotions, shame and disgust are always
about persons and never about acts. A potentially good emotion like
indignation can take a bad act as its target, without denying the ulti-
mate value of the person who committed that act (p. 166). Shame and
disgust, by contrast, operate by dismissing, rejecting, or degrading the
person who is their target (pp. io6, 207, 230, 233, 239). They are emo-
tions that are founded on the denial of the equal dignity of others. Be-
cause shame and disgust deny the personhood of those we condemn,
moreover, they allow us to go too easy on ourselves: they allow us sim-
ply to cast the offender out from society, without searching our own
breasts to see if we too might be at fault (pp. 167-68). Not least, their
focus on persons rather than acts also allows these emotions to spin
out of control: "It is no accident that shame shifts rather rapidly from
real offense to mere dissident identity," for example, "because shame is
not about a bad act in the first place" (p. 235).
25 Nussbaum draws links to the work of Professors Mary Douglas and Robert Kaster. See
MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION
AND TABOO (1966); Robert A. Kaster, The Dynamics of Fastidium and the Ideology of Disgust,
131 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N 143 (2OOl).
26 Nussbaum further explores this topic elsewhere in the book, such as when she examines
"projective disgust and group subordination" (pp. 107-15) and when she links the pattern of "hid-
ing from humanity" with the hierarchical impulse (p. 336).
27o6 [Vol. 118:2698
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2706 2004-2005
BOOK REVIEW
All this means that we must condemn nearly all use of shame and
disgust in the law.2 7 To be sure, these emotions may be ineliminable in
human life (p. 7o). Nevertheless, "their social operations pose dangers
to a just society" (p. 70), which means that they must be kept out of
the management of social problems.
With those arguments in hand, Nussbaum can turn to her attack
on the legal literature. Her first targets are the defenders of disgust.
Nussbaum is particularly concerned with refuting a style of legal
analysis that dates back to Lord Devlin's famous response to the Wolf-
enden Report of 1957, which addressed the law's treatment of homo-
sexual conduct and prostitution.2 8 Devlin insisted that the law had to
be founded on the sensibilities of "the man in the Clapham omnibus,"
whose disgust in the face of homosexuality could not be ignored.2 9
Devlin's arguments have recently been echoed by American scholars
like Judge Posner 30 and Professor Dan Kahan,31 who also believe that
the law should somehow reflect such popular sensibilities (though not
necessarily with regard to homosexuality). Nussbaum does agree that
the emotions lie at the foundation of our decision to criminalize: as she
sees it, we criminalize because we are angry. Nevertheless, she thinks
these sorts of arguments represent an unacceptable blindness to the
dangers of disgust. She is especially concerned about our attitudes to-
ward homosexuality, which she believes are driven by an utterly inap-
propriate and inhumane spirit of disgust (pp. 113-14). But the same is
also true, she thinks, of our attitude toward the disabled (pp. 305-19),
and she wants to speak for the party of humanity against all forms of
demeaning and degrading mistreatment. Playing with disgust means
blundering into a moral minefield of human psychology. Disgust is
simply "unreliable as [a] guide[] to public practice" (p. I3).
For Nussbaum, the same is true of shame. Some of the partici-
pants in the T-shirt debates have taken the position that shaming has a
valuable role to play in the criminal law. To be sure, none of them fa-
vors systematic humiliation or degradation as a matter of legal policy.
Scholars like Professor Kahan are hunting for humane solutions to the
problems of criminal justice: Kahan just wants to encourage relatively
27 Nussbaum does grant that disgust has an appropriate role in the law of nuisance (pp. 158-
63), and that shame has an appropriate role in political critique and in some social interactions
(pp. 211-6).
28 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (196 5) (discussing REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, Cmnd. 247).
29 Id. at 15.
30 Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, su-
ra note I, at 309, 317-18.
31 Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust, supra note i, at 626. Nussbaum also frames her argument in
part as an attack on Professor William Miller (pp. 82-84), although Miller in truth has little to say
about law as such.
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benign, but socially expressive, T-shirt and bumper-sticker sanctions.32
Nevertheless, Nussbaum rebels against any such approach. She be-
lieves that shame, like disgust, is simply "normatively unreliable in
public life" (p. 15). Even experimenting with such relatively tame
measures as T-shirts and bumper stickers may amount to playing with
psychological fire. Law is not some sort of technocratic enterprise in
governing human beings whose psyches are easily understood and eas-
ily manipulated. Law is an enterprise that involves moral choices,
which means that we may decide that certain tools, no matter how po-
tentially effective, cannot appropriately be used.
In order to avoid the evils of shame and disgust, Nussbaum con-
cludes, we must draw on the resources of different traditions: Kantian
social contract theory and Millian liberalism. The Kantian tradition
provides the foundation of an egalitarian ethics. This is particularly
important for framing a theory of criminal punishment. Kant and his
followers have taught that retributivism is the proper theory of pun-
ishment. In a society founded on the social contract, we all agree to
submit to the criminal law. This implies that, as members in good
standing of our society, we have (in the famously weird Kantian
phrase) a "right to be punished. '33 The punishment to which we have
this right must of course be punishment for our acts, not a rejection of
our selves as persons (pp. 238-39).
The Millian tradition also offers a valuable resource, if we read it
in light of eudaimonistic ethics. The good life is a life of eudaimonistic
self-realization. Mill believed that the purpose of liberty, or at least
one of the purposes of liberty, is to facilitate self-development (pp. 334-
35). Shame and disgust are the enemies of happy self-development.
This implies that a Millian liberal order is one that must condemn
shame and disgust. Moreover, Mill's suspiciousness toward the tyr-
anny of the "normal" can be interpreted as a rejection of hierarchy
similar to Nussbaum's own rejection (p. 337). Together, Kant and Mill
help guide us to a law unencumbered by dangerous emotions.
II. THE PERSON/ACT DISTINCTION IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND LAW
It is hard to be anything but glad that Nussbaum has written this
book. We need pleas on behalf of civilization, and this is a passionate
one, powerfully written and based on some of the best of what the
contemporary humanities have to offer. Nussbaum is absolutely right
32 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note i, at 630-52.
33 See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right To Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern
Penal Thought, i6 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 115-6 (1998) (discussing the philosophical origins of
the "right to be punished").
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that legal academics have not appreciated the challenges that the post-
liberal world presents. The familiar theories of punishment give us no
way to analyze the dangers posed by the human tendency that erupted
at Abu Ghraib - the tendency to degrade and humiliate. There is
also much to be said for the idea that law should be oriented toward
the ideals of human flourishing and self-realization. One of the finest
and most subtle legal traditions of our age, German law, embraces pre-
cisely those ideals: contemporary German law is founded on a constitu-
tionalized "right to the free development of . . . personality"34 that em-
braces many of the ideals advocated by Nussbaum; and those who
know German law are commonly full of admiration for it.35 Not least
among this book's virtues, Nussbaum offers many sensitive and inter-
esting arguments about a variety of legal problems, notably in her con-
sistently stimulating chapter on the right and wrong uses of disgust in
the law (pp. 124-7I).
Nevertheless, there is something uncomfortably utopian about
Nussbaum's vision of a law that radically resists hierarchical impulses,
and there is something implausible about the idea that the law can be
consistently in the business of fostering individual flourishing. Nuss-
baum herself acknowledges that the kind of morally just society she
hopes for can never be "fully achieve[d]" (p. 17). The problems run
deeper than that, though: There are more severe obstacles to realizing
her vision than she has been willing to recognize. There are obstacles
in applying the person/act distinction in the law. There are obstacles
in making her theory of the control of the emotions a practical reality.
There are obstacles in eliminating hierarchy. None of these obstacles
are faced in this book.
Many of the obstacles have to do with straightforward difficulty in
applying eudaimonistic moral philosophy to the law. Eudaimonistic
moral philosophy addresses itself to individuals who are making deci-
sions about their own lives. The law, by contrast, generally addresses
itself to legal officials and other legal actors - to people who are ob-
liged to make decisions affecting the lives of others. There is a signifi-
cant moral gap between the responsibility for one's own life and the
responsibility for the lives of others. Of course, that gap can be, and
has been, bridged by thoughtful eudaimonistic philosophers. 36 But the
34 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2(I) (F.R.G.).
35 For a general comparison of German and American constitutional law, see EDWARD J.
EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE
UNITED STATES (2002).
36 For a discussion of Seneca's focus on the problems of legal officials and judges in the trea-
tise ON ANGER, see Brad Inwood, The Will in Seneca the Younger, 95 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY
44, 58-59 (2000).
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work of bridging it must be done carefully and convincingly, and all
too often one feels that Nussbaum has not done so.
Consider, for example, shame. Nussbaum argues eloquently for the
unacceptability of shame as a matter of eudaimonistic moral philoso-
phy: I was moved by her argument that a person who surrenders to
shame is "hiding from humanity," and thus living an emptier life.
Moving as it is, though, that argument is not easy to translate into le-
gal policy. Even the most dedicated critics of shaming (among whom I
count myself) must acknowledge that there will always be some un-
avoidable element of shame and stigmatization in the law, especially in
the criminal law. Criminals cannot be completely shielded from expo-
sure: at some point, the public interest in being informed about poten-
tial criminality must trump the offender's interest in being protected
from exposure. Accordingly, even legal systems profoundly committed
to safeguarding the dignity of the offender recognize that there are lim-
its.3 7 Why is this? The basic answer is that legal officials cannot limit
themselves to worrying about their own lives and well-being, or even
about the lives and well-being of offenders. They are also responsible
for the lives and well-being of the general public. The moral responsi-
bilities of the law are not primarily responsibilities for the care of
oneself.
In consequence, the question is not whether we can ban shame
from the law - we cannot - but how legal officials should balance
the conflicting interests of the offender and society. This question is,
moreover, one of pressing public importance, on which a book about
the law of shame should take a position. When exactly may the press
publicize the names of offenders? Should the public have access to sex
offender registries? Many views can be held on these issues. Rejecting
shame without reservation is not a plausible one. Nussbaum could
certainly respond to this objection by offering a more nuanced account
of eudaimonistic philosophy - one that explored how good and happy
legal officials should take moral responsibility for others. If she did so,
though, I believe she would arrive at a different, and less absolutist,
account of the place of shame in the law.
The difficulties do not end there. Other examples raise even deeper
doubts about her argument. In particular, I am uneasy with one of her
37 For an example of how German law tries to balance these interests, see KARL EGBERT
WENZEL, DAs RECHT DER WORT- UND BILDBERICHTERSTATTUNG 448-49 (4th rev. ed.
1994). Nussbaum cites my work, JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISH-
MENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003), for the
proposition that shame and stigma, or at least humiliation, need not always accompany impris-
onment (p. 247). Yet the absolute elimination of shame is too much to hope for. Professionals in
France and Germany, the subjects of my book, certainly do make every effort to introduce dignity
into punishment. Complete elimination of stigma, however, is more than anyone can achieve.
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principal approaches to the problem of distinguishing shame and dis-
gust from more acceptable emotions like anger: her effort to condemn
shame and disgust on the grounds that their targets are persons, not
acts (pp. 13-15). Here again, and here especially, good eudaimonistic
moral philosophy is not easy to translate into law.
The proposition that law should be about acts and not persons cer-
tainly has great appeal. There is an old Christian tradition that
strongly endorses the proposition that we must look upon acts and not
upon persons.3 8 We are charged, according to Augustine, to love the
sinner even while hating the sin.39 The classical liberalism of the nine-
teenth century insisted strongly on the same view, 40 as do opponents of
affirmative action in our day.4 1 Moreover, Nussbaum is surely right
that a law that uses persons rather than acts as units of analysis is a
law that may lend itself to excesses of shame and disgust and to nasty
forms of social hierarchy.
Nevertheless, no legal system has ever succeeded in focusing en-
tirely on acts rather than on persons, and the jurisprudential difficul-
ties raised by the person/act distinction are immense. Some of the dif-
ficulties are of no great interest to Nussbaum: she is not likely to be
bothered by the question whether commercial law is properly a law of
merchants or a law of commercial transactions. But there are other
corners of the law of direct interest to her, in which the debate is in-
tense and almost violent. Is the law of homosexuality a law of homo-
sexual acts or a law of homosexual persons?42 Opinion is deeply di-
vided. Some of our gay fellow citizens want to be regarded as
homosexual persons. Others want to be regarded as persons who per-
form homosexual acts. Is one of these views morally preferable? How
should we deal with the same issue when it appears in the law? The
38 The classic Christian term is "prosopolepsia," which translates from Greek as "respect of
persons." See Colossians 3:25; James 2:1; Romans 2:11.
39 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. XIV, ch. 6, at 448 (Marcus Dods trans., Mod-
ern Library 1993).
40 Thomas Holland expressed a classic nineteenth-century view:
Now as a matter of fact the personal dimension is one which in the majority of cases
needs no consideration at all. When the Persons... are human beings who are citizens
of full age and sound mind, not under coverture, or convicted of crime, in other words
when their personality is "normal," the personal dimension of the right in question is
wholly disregarded.
THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE iig (Oxford, The Clar-
endon Press, 4 th ed. 1888).
41 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitu-
tional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, ioi n.340
(1999) ("Opponents of affirmative action defend principles of formal equality .... " (emphasis
omitted) (citing William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Consti-
tution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979))).
42 See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 919-23 (1989).
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majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas43 vindicated the right of "homo-
sexual persons" not to be "demean[ed]. ''44 Justice O'Connor's signifi-
cantly different concurrence, by contrast, rested in effect on the claim
that the law must afford equal treatment to homosexual acts.45 Which
is it? Is it possible that we do not have to make a choice? The prob-
lem is vexing - and central to our thinking on law and homosexuality.
Although Hiding from Humanity is a philosophical book in large part
about homosexuality, and one that depends on the distinction between
persons and acts, it gives us no sense of what position Nussbaum
would take. This omission is a serious disappointment, on a matter on
which we would hope a philosopher of her caliber would give us
guidance.
Affirmative action is another unavoidable example. Opponents of
affirmative action typically insist that judgments should be made
strictly on the basis of acts and not on the basis of personal identity -
that the law should hold to the basic norm of formal equality.46 Nuss-
baum has publicly declared her disagreement with this view: "I believe
that formal equality is not enough. Some people face more obstacles
than others to come up to a minimum condition of decent existence.
You have to do something more for those who are clearly at a disad-
vantage."'4 ' This is cogently put, but how are her views on the moral-
ity of affirmative action related to her views on the morality of shame
and disgust? Are there moments in making legal policy when it is
morally appropriate to focus on persons?
Criminal law presents comparably complex problems: with the rise
of determinate sentencing, our punishment system has moved sharply
against individualization. This means that in contemporary American
sentencing we have dramatically shifted the focus from persons to
acts. Some commentators think this is a bad thing - that it has
43 123 S. Ct. 2427 (2003).
44 Id. at 2482 (emphasis added).
45 See id. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Tlhis law as applied to private,
consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. . . ."). Justice
O'Connor's analysis certainly rested on the protection of persons under the Equal Protection
Clause. See id. at 2484 ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'is essen-
tially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."' (quoting City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985))). But Justice O'Connor viewed
the statute as one whose units of analysis were acts and not persons. See id. at 2485 ("Texas treats
the same conduct differently based solely on the participants."). An opinion, like Justice
O'Connor's, that imagines the law as regulating acts rather than persons is relatively unlikely to
be framed in terms of dignitary interests. An opinion, like that of Justice Kennedy, that imagines
the law as regulating persons is far more likely to emphasize dignity.
46 See Tushnet, supra note 41, at ioi n.340 (citing Van Alstyne, supra note 41, at 8og).
47 "The Bush Govt Is Turning the War Against Terrorism into a Cold War", INDIAN EXPRESS
(New Delhi), Jan. 30, 2003, at 9 (quoting Martha Nussbaum), available at http://www.law.
uchicago.edu/news/nussbaum-indianexpress.html.
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undermined the best virtues of judging48 and has contributed to the
spectacular punitiveness of American justice. 49  Does Nussbaum
agree? Do her views on the law of punishment square with her views
on the morality of shame and disgust? It may be that Nussbaum has
answers to these questions. The difficulty is that she has not ad-
dressed them, in a book whose logic seems to require that she do so.
Behind these failures lies a deeper one. The person/act distinction
raises difficult questions in the law precisely because the moral di-
lemma of legal actors is so complex and challenging, and so different
from the basic moral dilemmas presupposed by Nussbaum's eudai-
monistic ethics as presented in this book. Legal actors, to say it again,
make decisions about the lives of others. In consequence, they often
crave information about those others' lives. We should interpret the
person/act distinction in the law against this backdrop. When we
choose to focus on "persons" rather than on "acts" in the law, we do so
in order to provide legal officials with more information, so that they
can reassure themselves that they are making morally justifiable deci-
sions. Thus, if we insist that we should have a law of homosexual per-
sons rather than a law of homosexual acts, it is because we think that
there are morally relevant complexities in the lives of those affected
that are not captured by an account of any momentary act. If we fa-
vor affirmative action, it is because we think the predicament of an
individual cannot be seen in abstraction from a richer texture of his-
torical and social experience. If we insist that commercial law should
be a law of merchants rather than a law of commercial transactions, it
is because we think focusing on a given transaction without attention
to the identities of the parties may make for injustice or poor policy.
The same, finally, is true of individualization in punishment. To say
that we consider "persons" in the law is just a way of saying that we
insist on a thick account of the world before we make judgments that
affect the fate of others.
I suspect that Nussbaum agrees with this way of characterizing the
person/act distinction in the law. Indeed, when she has written di-
rectly about legal philosophy, notably in her well-known essay on
mercy, she has shown tremendous acuity in addressing exactly such
questions: that essay is precisely about the link between humane pun-
ishment and "sensitivity to all the particulars of a person and situa-
tion. '15  Nor is it surprising that she should agree. When we focus on
persons in the law, we do so for much the same reason that Nussbaum
48 See KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 84 (1998).
49 See James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85-86
(2003).
50 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 85 (1993).
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and other moral philosophers insist on the moral value of the emo-
tions: in the pursuit of a richer account of human life. Of course, this
does present a danger: any time we focus on persons rather than acts,
we risk yielding to some ugly hierarchical impulses. Punishment offers
the most familiar example. If we allow ourselves to punish the same
act differently when it is committed by different persons, we may be
opening the door to racism: we may end up punishing blacks more se-
verely than whites.-' Nevertheless, it is not clear that the right re-
sponse to this problem is to ban all consideration of persons in the law.
The right response may involve the more delicate philosophical task of
distinguishing between the good and the bad ways of considering per-
sons in the law.
This is exactly the kind of delicate task that one expects a philoso-
pher with Nussbaum's gifts to undertake. She does not do so. In Hid-
ing from Humanity, she has simply not chosen to address legal phi-
losophy directly. She has not made the effort to square her moral
philosophy with her legal philosophy, to explain why her eudaimonistic
reasoning about shame and disgust seems to lead her in a different di-
rection from her legal reasoning about mercy. The result, when it
comes to the person/act distinction, is that the reader - even a reader
who, like me, is thoroughly sympathetic to Nussbaum's project -
closes her book feeling somewhat put off, and somewhat disappointed.
In other ways, too, the failure of this book to address directly the
problems of the law creates frustration. The law of homosexuality is
not the only area in which there are raging debates on which one
would expect Nussbaum to offer guidance. For example, the logic of
her book would seem to require her to take a position on the law of
privacy. Legal scholars often conceive of the law of privacy as involv-
ing protection from shame in order to guarantee individual dignity -
especially in the European countries that treat the protection of pri-
vacy as an aspect of the larger protection of "personality."52 At the
same time, plenty of arguments can be offered against the proposition
that law should be in any such business. The issues are tense and dif-
ficult; here, as elsewhere in the law, there are too many conflicting in-
terests to permit a clean answer. Consider workplace privacy, for ex-
ample. Many courts have seen good reason to view the privacy claims
of employees skeptically, no matter how humiliated or violated
those employees may feel. 3 Does this raise the same questions for
Nussbaum as violations of the dignity of criminal offenders or gays?
51 This danger was famously flagged by MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 9-1I (1973).
52 See, e.g., EBERLE, supra note 35, at 79-110.
53 See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 507-08 (D. Kan.
1996), ahfd, io8 F.3d 1388 (ioth Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
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Employees, after all, have an exit option not enjoyed by prison in-
mates, and their belief that they have a right to privacy over such
things as their workplace e-mails may be philosophically dubious.
Nussbaum offers only a cursory few pages on privacy, failing to wade
into these sorts of messy debates about the legal realization of her
moral ideals (pp. 296-304). This is frustrating to the reader.
The book's failure to address the messy details is particularly frus-
trating when it comes to criminal punishment. What theory of pun-
ishment should we favor if we believe in the eudaimonistic project of
aiding humans in living the good life? The German answer, unsurpris-
ingly, is to favor rehabilitation.5 4 If we take a eudaimonistic approach,
if we think of the law as having a "therapeutic" function, if we want to
help offenders live better lives, then we should commit ourselves to
crafting individualized therapies in order to reintegrate the offender
into society as soon as possible, under the most effective supervision
possible. Given her philosophical commitments, one might have ex-
pected Nussbaum to agree. Yet she comes out in favor of retributiv-
ism (pp. 69-70, 238-39). Why? Part of her answer, no doubt, is that
rehabilitationism seems objectionable to her because it regards the per-
son of the offender rather than the act committed. But that answer is
much too pat. Even the most determined rehabilitationists leave some
room for retributivist goals. 55 Indeed, a careful exploration of prob-
lems in the philosophy of punishment might have given Nussbaum an
opportunity to show how her Kantian retributivism can be reconciled
with her eudaimonistic philosophy. It is (again) disappointing that she
does not do so.
III. AvoIDING EMOTIONAL EXCESS:
THE PROBLEM OF RETRIBUTIVISM
Nussbaum's embrace of Kantian retributivism is unsatisfying for
another reason - one that goes to the heart of her account of the emo-
tions, and to the critical question of how the emotions can be practi-
cally controlled. It also goes to the heart of the peculiar choices she
has made within the literature of psychology.
Nussbaum's emotionalism is an emotionalism of the juste milieu.
In line with the long Aristotelian tradition to which she belongs, she
neither endorses nor condemns the emotions tout court.5 6 Instead, she
54 See WHITMAN, supra note 37, at 88-go.
55 Compare the well-known philosophical effort to identify the proper role of retributivism in
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
8-13 (1968). See also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22
CRIME & JUST. 363, 365-78 (997) (discussing Norval Morris's influential concept of "limiting
retributivism').
56 See supra pp. 2702-03.
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is in search of a golden mean, a way of living an emotional life without
living it to excess. Of course, the power of any such approach depends
on its account of excess. When is it wrong to give in to our anger, for
example, or our indignation? How do we control emotions that might
potentially go bad?
Here again, Nussbaum's answers are drawn from the same moral
philosophy. In part she holds, in line with the long eudaimonistic tra-
dition, that the test of excess is the measure of our own individual
well-being: we should not yield to our anger when doing so would
make our lives less valuable and less well-spent (p. ioo).57 In part, her
answers depend on the act/person distinction: emotions veer into the
unacceptable when they target persons, rather than acts (p. 106). By
having a healthy concern for our own inner well-being, and by re-
membering to love the sinner even while hating the sin, we will keep
our emotions under control.
But here again, while Nussbaum's theory may make for good
moral philosophy, it does not obviously make for good law. Consider
the question of retributivism. Retributivism poses, one might think,
the perfect case for exploring Nussbaum's approach. As philosophers
frequently observe, the "retributive emotions" can take two forms in
the law: one commonly deemed bad and one commonly deemed
good.5 8 The bad form is vengefulness. When we allow our desire for
retribution to get out of hand, when we yield to our hatred for the of-
fender, we cease to compute rational, proportional punishments. In-
stead, we begin to descend into the all-too-familiar syndrome of social
vengeance. The good form, by contrast, involves the sober calculation
of proportional punishment, to be dispassionately meted out to an of-
fender whom we continue to regard as our fellow human being and
fellow citizen.
5 9
The trick, of course, is figuring out how to keep the retributive
emotions from degenerating into vengefulness. This is not just a par-
lor problem for philosophers. It is a pressing problem in modern socie-
ties, not least our own. America has seen a revival of both the phi-
losophy and the rhetoric of "retribution" over the last thirty years
or so.60 This revival has coincided with a massive and troubling
57 Ancient philosophers regarded "honor and money" as "external goods" that are typically
overvalued, giving rise to unjustified anger (p. ioo).
58 For a philosophical discussion of the place of emotions in the law, see Robert C. Solomon,
Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra
note i, at 123. For the phrase "retributive emotions," see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology,
the Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra note i, at 149.
59 Nussbaum provides her own account of this standard topos (pp. 238-39).
60 I have more extensively reviewed the contemporary American scene in WHITMAN, supra
note 37, at 41-67.
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intensification of American punitiveness. This intensification is
marked most notably by our incarceration rates, now the highest in the
industrialized world,6 1 and it includes phenomena like the reintroduc-
tion of chain gangs and the determined prosecution of minors. 62 Un-
der these circumstances, it is hard not to regard our society as signally
failing to make the philosophical distinction between the good sort of
retributivism and mere vengefulness. Using the word "retribution,"
however philosophically justifiable, seems to amount, all too often, to
tossing red meat to the most animalistic instincts of those who vote in
American elections.
This tendency toward vengefulness is not an exclusively American
problem. Other societies faced the same kinds of problems throughout
the twentieth century. After World War II, for example, Europe was
wracked by destructive episodes of collective vengeance - a Europe-
wide "politics of retribution" that is now the subject of a growing lit-
erature.63 Durkheimian sociology argues, moreover, that these sorts of
problems are inevitable everywhere: the collective desire for social
vengeance is a human universal. 64 Anthropologists and legal histori-
ans regard the desire for vengeance as fundamental to the organization
of human society.65 Interpreting the history of almost any past society
is impossible without acknowledging the prevalence and intensity of
the human inclination toward escalating vengefulness.
Humans, one is forced to conclude, are simply vengeful animals, or
at least ones that can be trained to abandon vengeance for retribution
only with the greatest difficulty. This presents a prime challenge in
the management of human society. Certainly, as Professor Victoria
Nourse has recently argued, it presents a prime challenge in criminal
law. Criminal law, claims Nourse, is largely an exercise in cabining
vengeance. 66 Most notably, the law of provocation can be interpreted
as a law concerned with nothing other than managing vengeful im-
pulses. 67 This interpretation is indeed a familiar topos in debates
61 See Gail Russell Chaddock, U.S. Notches World's Highest Incarceration Rate, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Aug. 18, 2003, at 2.
62 See Whitman, supra note 49, at Ioi.
63 See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR II AND ITS
AFTERMATH (Istvdn Dedk et al. eds., 2000); UNE POIGN9E DE MIS19RABLES: L'1PURATION
DE LA SOCI9T9 FRANqAISE APRIS LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE (Marc Olivier Baruch
ed., 2003).
64 See ROGER COTTERRELL, 9MILE DURKHEIM: LAW IN A MORAL DOMAIN 65-81
(igg); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 23-46 (i99o).
65 See, e.g., LA VENGEANCE: 9TUDES D'ETHNOLOGIE, D'HISTOIRE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE
(Raymond Verdier et al. eds., 1g8o-i984).
66 See VF. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, i51 U. PA. L. REV. 169 i , 692
(2003).
67 See id. at 1716-2o.
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about the law dating back at least to the Oresteia of Aeschylus. 6s It is
a familiar topos in the political theory of the law too, relevant most
importantly to the work of Max Weber.
69
Surely this familiar topos is natural territory for Nussbaum.70 The
problem of keeping societies from descending into vengefulness is
nothing other than a problem in the control of the emotions in the law.
We have to find some way of keeping collective vengefulness from
spinning out of control. Indeed, Nussbaum is fully aware of the dan-
gers (p. 239). Yet how much help is Nussbaum's eudaimonistic ap-
proach? She cites Herbert Morris and the acute writings of Dan
Markel for the proposition that we must maintain a distinction be-
tween good retributivism and bad vengefulness (pp. 238-39)." 1 All
well and good. But how do we make this idea a practical reality?
How do we succeed in controlling public emotions that spin out of
control so readily? Nussbaum's moral philosophy does not give per-
suasive answers. We can certainly condemn the American punitive-
ness of the present, or the European punitiveness of the past, by ob-
serving that the people involved have forgotten the philosophical
distinction between retribution and vengeance. We can wag our fin-
gers at those who forget that morality commands us to condemn acts,
not persons. We can feel philosophical pity for those who have yielded
to their vengeful impulses; after all, they have only deprived them-
selves of the inner good life. At the limit, we can try to ensure that all
citizens will receive an adequate moral education in school. None of
that seems to take seriously the challenge of managing human society.
When it comes to the retributive emotions, Nussbaum simply does
not offer us the help we need; she does not offer any prescription for
how to curb our seemingly inevitable tendency toward vengefulness.
This is symptomatic of a larger failing in her approach to the psychol-
ogy of the emotions. While vengefulness is a problem in the psychic
68 See, e.g., ERIC A. HAVELOCK, THE GREEK CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 279-80 0978).
69 See, e.g., MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT: GRUNDRISS DER VER-
STEHENDEN SOZIOLOGIE 516 (sth ed. 1976) (outlining his theory of monopolization of vio-
lence).
70 Indeed, in a couple of passages, Nussbaum acknowledges the importance of this dynamic.
She discusses the "true man" doctrine as reflecting concerns with personal honor (p. 43) and the
problem of "manly honor" (p. 63) - incarnations of legally channeled violence.
71 1 must protest one misuse of my own writings adopted by Nussbaum from Markel. I wrote
several years ago that shame penalties "seem beautifully retributive." James Q. Whitman, What
Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, IO62 (1998) (emphasis added).
Through this phrase I described the attitudes of others toward these punishments, without offer-
ing my own account of retributivism. But Markel, see Markel, supra note I, at 2182, and Nuss-
baum (p. 239) cite this passage as though I had offered such an account. What I do believe is
stated in the text of this Review: "retribution" is a slogan that encourages punitiveness, and
Markel and Nussbaum have not offered any reason to suppose that careful philosophizing about
the distinction between retribution and vengeance can do anything to ward off that danger.
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constitution of human animals, it is not the problem that interests her.
It is not about animals who make themselves unhappy by failing to
come to terms with their body fluids or their mortality. It is about
animals who have an inclination to feel slighted, and who gratify
themselves by taking vengeance. It is about human animals who are
all too often nasty, violent creatures - the kinds of creatures we see in
the Abu Ghraib photos.
Because Nussbaum favors a "therapeutic" moral philosophy, she
does not provide a psychological theory that can account for the social
problems presented by those kinds of creatures. This focus on the
therapeutic noticeably affects the choices she makes within the litera-
ture of psychology. Nussbaum draws on psychological theories that
are either intended to comfort the ailing individual, or that can be
turned to that purpose. This is what attracts her to the psychoanalytic
theories of Winnicott and others like him (pp. 179-85). By contrast,
she shows no interest in psychological studies that bring out the more
troubling aspects of the collective psychological dynamic of punish-
ment. For example, she does not cite the famous Stanford prison ex-
periment of 1971, which seemed to show how quickly and spectacu-
larly a group of subjects assigned the role of prison guards could spin
out of control. 72 Nor does she cite any of the numerous other studies
that explore the prevalence of a kind of vengefulness among individu-
als who punish - a vengefulness little touched by philosophical so-
phistication. 73 Since those studies are not about providing therapy to
the emotionally unbalanced individual, they are of no real relevance to
her argument.
Yet the problems of the retributive emotions, at least from the law-
yer's point of view, are not problems in therapizing the souls of un-
happy punishers. They are problems in managing collective impulses
toward vengeance.
IV. TAKING HIERARCHY SERIOUSLY
Similar complaints can be voiced about Nussbaum's treatment of
human hierarchical impulses. Here again, her psychology does not
72 Haney et al., supra note 14.
73 See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002); John M. Darley et
al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659
(2ooo); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on
the Death Penalty, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at i9; Robert M. McFatter, Purposes of Pun-
ishment: Effects of Utilities of Criminal Sanctions on Perceived Appropriateness, 67 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 255 (1982); Robert M. McFatter, Sentencing Strategies and Justice: Effects of Punish-
ment Philosophy on Sentencing Decisions, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1490 (1978);
Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why? The Psychology
of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 237 (i997).
20051 BOOK REVIEW 2719
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2719 2004-2005
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
seem adequate to the phenomena of collective behavior that confront
us. I find this especially disappointing, since Nussbaum's Stoic tradi-
tion seems especially well placed to address the problems of human
hierarchy.
Nussbaum condemns shame and disgust as hierarchical emotions,
the indulgence of which is inconsistent with the demands that moral
philosophy puts on the wise and honorable individual actor. Her pro-
ject is to explore "the institutional and developmental conditions for
the sustenance of a liberal respect for human equality" (p. i6). Any
such project requires "removing stigma and hierarchy wherever they
occur" (p. I7). 4 This project is stirring. But how useful is it as a pre-
scription for managing the collective dynamic of human society?
There is every reason to think that humans, like other primates, have a
consistent tendency to organize their societies in the hierarchical way
that the awful little society of Abu Ghraib was organized.75  There is
also every reason to think that this tendency resists easy correction
through therapeutic individual psychology. There may be a founda-
tion for tendencies toward hierarchy in individual psychology, to be
sure. Studies do suggest that individuals perceive the social world as a
place structured around respect, disrespect, claims of superiority, and
claims of inferiority.76  We can also propose therapies intended to help
individuals overcome those perceptions. 77 What we cannot do is radi-
cally reconstitute human society. After all, a large body of sociology,
including most famously the work of Goffman 78 and Simmel,79
suggests that hierarchical relations are the very tissue of human social
interactions.
A tendency toward hierarchy also arguably pervades the criminal
law in particular, if we accept the well-known claims of Jean
74 Nussbaum discusses a similar idea in her chapter on disgust (p. 117).
75 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST. THE EVOLUTION OF
EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR (1999). By saying that human societies tend to take hierarchical
forms, I do not deny that they sometimes take egalitarian forms. Boehm's book is an effort to
demonstrate how the apparent egalitarianism of small hunter-gatherer societies could have been
the evolutionary result of hierarchical forms of organization still observable in other primates.
See id. at 171-96.
76 See, e.g., Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 527 (2001).
77 See, e.g., AARON T. BECK, PRISONERS OF HATE: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF ANGER,
HOSTILITY, AND VIOLENCE 249-68 (1999).
78 ERVING GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RITUAL
47 (1967).
79 GEORG SIMMEL, SOZIOLOGIE: UNTERSUCHUNGEN UBER DIE FORMEN DER VERGE-
SELLSCHAFTUNG 272-73 (1992).
2720 [Vol. 118:2698
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2720 2004-2005
BOOK REVIEW
Hampton.8 0 As Hampton argued, the moral structure of the criminal
law assumes a psychology of respect and disrespect, of inferiority and
superiority. Our urge to punish grows out of a particular emotion: the
emotion of resentment. We want to "put down" offenders, because we
feel that they have treated themselves as our superiors, using us as
mere means to their ends. The very morality of criminal punishment,
on this Hamptonian account, is founded on the human psychology of
superior/inferior status relations."'
Nussbaum is perfectly aware of the intractability of human social
hierarchy. She insists, though, that the "liberal state" should not lend
its agency to any such hierarchical form of organization (p. 232); law
simply should not orient itself toward hierarchical values. But how
practicable is this? Without a doubt, there are utterly obnoxious and
unacceptable forms of hierarchy in the law. We are all committed to
stamping out systems of apartheid, and indeed to stamping out any-
thing that "puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a
... class of our fellow-citizens. ' 's 2 Any legal system organized in such
a way as to enforce systematic status degradation is a legal system we
can all agree to condemn as evil.
It cannot be the case, though, that condemning systematic status
degradation commits us to the hopeless project of eliminating all supe-
rior/inferior relations in the law. Even in societies deeply dedicated to
the general norm of equality, the particular moral challenges of the law
are a product of the law's necessary involvement in the hierarchical
exercise of power. Punishers do indeed stand in a position of superior-
ity over those they punish. Counseling those engaged in individual
acts of punishment by citing Kant and declaring that we must regard
our fellow human beings as equals does minimal good. The realities of
the living relationship require us to admit that punishment is a hierar-
chical business, and to try to regulate it as such. As ancient philoso-
phers recognized, there must always be an element of chastisement -
of superior/inferior relations - in punishment.8 3 Nor is it just a mat-
ter of the infliction of punishment. Judges in criminal sentencing, like
punishers, stand as superiors over inferiors. They need ethical rules
about how to comport themselves when deciding the fates of the
80 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988); Jean
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS i
(Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
81 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 80, at 125, 13o; Hampton, supra note 8o, at i4, i6.
82 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83 See DANIELLE S. ALLEN, THE WORLD OF PROMETHEUS: THE POLITICS OF PUNISH-
ING IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 69-70 (2000) (discussing punishment as a way to teach wrongdo-
ers their proper place in society); Kenneth J. Dover, Fathers, Sons and Forgiveness, i6
ILL. CLASSICAL STUD. 173, 177 (1991) (discussing punishment as an element of training and
education).
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weaker persons thrown upon them. Testators also stand in a position
of superiority to their potential beneficiaries. They need ethical rules
about how to dispense the financial favors that they are in a position
to dispense. Even contract parties contemplating breach can be
thought of as standing in a position of superiority over their partners.
These are the problems that the practical ethics of law must solve.
They are not problems that Hiding from Humanity has addressed.
This is particularly disappointing because Nussbaum is in a position to
provide such useful philosophical guidance. Ancient philosophy offers
a wealth of resources for dealing with the ethics of human hierarchy.
The ancient world was, after all, a world of sharp hierarchy - a
world of masters and slaves, patrons and clients. In that world, moral
philosophers worried constantly about how to exercise power. The
Stoic tradition is particularly rich and subtle in this regard. In the
writings of the ancient Stoics we learn, for example, that a master who
is interested in pursuing the good life should not lose his temper while
beating his human property: one is to beat one's slaves dispassion-
ately.8 4 We also find plenty of advice about how rich and powerful pa-
trons should treat the clients who are their supplicants: a patron inter-
ested in pursuing the good life should understand how to make his
superiority clear without showing contempt.
8 5
At first glance, it is understandable that Nussbaum does not care to
discuss these aspects of ancient philosophy, or its modern parallels.
These sorts of ancient ideas seem, well, disgusting and shameful, and
completely out of place in our egalitarian world. The same goes for
modern philosophy: when Nietzsche talks about hierarchical relations
- something he does with endless zest and malign wit - he is at his
most unpleasant. 86 Today, we can see absolutely nothing "moral" in a
rule about how to stay cool and collected while you beat your slaves.
84 See MIRIAM T. GRIFFIN, SENECA: A PHILOSOPHER IN POLITICS 261-62 (r976); see also
KEITH BRADLEY, SLAVERY AND SOCIETY AT ROME 28 (994) (describing Galen's advice
against punishing slaves in the heat of anger); PIERO A. MILANI, LA SCHIAVITO NEL
PENSIERO POLITICO DAI GRECI AL BASSO MEDIO EVO 220-21 & nn.44-45 (1972) (describing
Seneca not as an abolitionist but as an advocate of humane treatment of slaves).
85 Leading ancient historian Paul Veyne has provided a rich discussion on ancient philoso-
phers' advice to patrons. See Paul Veyne, Avant-Propos to SENEQUE: ENTRETIENS LETTRES
A LUCILIUS, at xix-xx (Paul Veyne ed., 1993) (noting that in pursuing the good life, the powerful
man gives benefits without displaying arrogance); cf Richard Saller, Patronage and Friendship in
Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction, in PATRONAGE IN ANCIENT SOCIETY 49, 57-
58 (Andrew Wallace-Hadrill ed., 199o) (discussing relations between powerful patrons and cli-
ents); Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire, in
PATRONAGE IN ANCIENT SOCIETY, supra, at 63, 63-85 (giving a general account of Roman
patronage relations).
86 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, JENSEITS VON GUT UND BOSE, chs. 204-40, at 129-
80 (Kritische Studienausgabe ed., de Gruyter 1999) (1886) (surveying workings, and advantages,
of hierarchical relations in human society).
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Nevertheless, these most repellant passages of the ancient (and mod-
ern) philosophers may be the best starting point for an updated Stoic
philosophy of law - one that provides a foundation for confronting
pragmatically the moral challenges of our own legal system. Seneca
and Nietzsche cannot be accused of a lack of psychological realism
when it comes to the problems that led to Abu Ghraib. They knew
perfectly well that human beings are naturally hierarchical primates,
always inclined to surrender to the desire to humiliate and degrade
others. To them, the challenges of quotidian ethics - the challenges of
wielding power over others - could not be addressed by the utopian
project of eliminating hierarchy entirely. Unlike Kant, they did not
suppose that ethics could be reduced to the governance of relations be-
tween equals. Ethical problems, they knew, involve doing favors and
exercising authority. By implication, ethical problems are problems in
how superiors treat inferiors; and ethical solutions involve prescribing
the right way for superiors to treat inferiors. Far from requiring that
we eliminate hierarchy, their sort of ethics requires that we organize it,
tame it, live it in the right way.
All that seems radically removed from modern morality. Neverthe-
less, it arguably offers a more faithful account of most of today's law
than anything offered by most modern egalitarian philosophers. Stoic
philosophy is useful in dealing with the ethical challenges of hierarchy
precisely because it is written by and for powerful people - people,
like the fabulously wealthy and powerful Seneca himself, with respon-
sibility for the lives of others.8 7 It is eudaimonistic philosophy, but the
questions it asks about individual happiness are often questions about
how to handle responsibility for the lives of others: how to best hand
out favors, how to show mercy to inferiors, or as the case may be, to
chastise inferiors. This is a philosophy that offers much for legal offi-
cials, and much for the law.
In particular, Stoic philosophy offers something when it comes to
dealing with the horrors of an Abu Ghraib. The problems in control-
ling the soldiers of the November, 2003, nightshift at Abu Ghraib are
problems of the emotions. But they are exactly the sorts of problems
that preoccupied the Stoic hierarchical tradition: they are problems in
learning to remain cool and collected while exercising authority. As
Augustine, that most humane realist of antiquity, declared, they are
problems in learning to act as a "minister of the law," without libido,
without passion. 88 I would insist, echoing Augustine, that the para-
mount problems of punishment involve maintaining a dispassionate
87 See Inwood, supra note 36, at 58-59.
88 FRANCO DE CAPITANI, IL DE LIBERO ARBITRIOO DI S. AGOSTINO 250 (1987) (arguing
that like soldiers, all legal officials who obey the law "sine libidine" ("without passion') act
legitimately).
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professional attitude. This goal is best served by leaving punishment
securely in the hands of professionals, by providing proper training
and supervision for punishment professionals, and by inspiring a pro-
fessional ethic.8 9 This goal is also well served by avoiding red-flag slo-
gans like "retribution," not to mention red-flag practices like stripping
prisoners naked and hooding them to hide their human faces from
their punishers. In any case, it is a goal that can never be attained if
we insist that reasoning about legal problems has to begin with a re-
jection of every hint of hierarchy.
V. CONCLUSION
Of course, it is no easy matter to explain exactly how legal actors
can check their passion at the door. "Dispassion" is not a concept easy
to analyze. Analyzing it is the challenging task of a philosophy of
emotions in the law. The disappointing truth is that Hiding from Hu-
manity never really tackles that task. This is a book by an acute and
learned moral philosopher. With its sensitivity to the complexity of
human psychology, and to the moral dilemmas of the human condi-
tion, this book offers what we need most: a philosophical call for
common sense in the face of degrading practices that our legal theories
seem unable to comprehend. It is written with conviction, and it
speaks for civilization at a moment when we need voices that speak
for civilization.
Yet it is just not a book that speaks enough about law. It speaks
too much about the moral predicament of individuals in general, and
too little about the moral predicament of legal actors in particular.
Nussbaum never cracks the philosophical nut that must be cracked:
she never explains how we can pass from the comparative clarity that
is the world of moral philosophy into the murk that is always the
world of law. She never explains how a philosophy oriented toward
making good and happy individuals can be transformed into a phi-
losophy about managing our legal responsibilities. There would be no
disappointment in this if she were a lesser scholar, or if the Stoic tradi-
tion were not so rich in advice for legal actors. "Tu multa dare potes,"
we want to say, with Seneca, "you are in a position to give us gifts in
great quantity," and we are willing to accept all of it.9° In the end,
though, Hiding from Humanity does not give us enough.
89 This is the burden of the argument I have offered in Whitman, supra note 71.
90 SENECA, DE BENEFICHS bk. V, ch. 4.
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